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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GEORGE N. ANDERSON and wife, IMOGENE
T. ANDERSON, LORENZO W. ANDERSON, heretofore known as LORENZO W. ANDERSON, JR.,
and wife HAZEL 11. ANDERSON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs
~IARIE

T. JOHNSON and CHESTER N. JOHN-

SON,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
ADDITIONAL STATE11:ENT OF FACTS
Lorenzo W. Anderson, a widower, died on or about
the 22nd day of June, 1949, at Brigham City, Box Elder
County, Utah, leaving as his sole and only surviving
heirs plaintiffs George N. Anderson and Lorenzo "'.
Anderson, Jr., sons, and Marie T. Anderson Johnson,
daughte:r. By their :amended complaint George N.
Anderson and Imogene T. Anderson, his wife, Lorenzo
W. Anderson and Hazel M. Anderson, his wife, filed
this action in the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah in and for Box Elder
County against :Marie T. Anderson Johnson and Chester
N. Johnson, her husband. In the amended complaint
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it is alleged that the plaintiffs Ren and George and the
daughter Marie are the sole and only heirs-at-laws of
deceased. It is further alleged in paragraph two that the
deceased left estate consisting of real and personal property in Box Elder County. Plaintiffs then allege that
during the month of March, 1943, the deceased made, executed and delivered several warranty deeds, one deed
to Ren and wife as joint tenants in what is designated as
tracts numbered 1 and 2, another deed to George and
wife, and a third deed to Marie and Chester
The complaint further alleges that in 1946, George
obtained a new deed from his father in lieu of his 1943
deed.
The complaint then alleges that the defendants on
or about the 7th day of February, 1949, at a time when
the decedent was incompetent, and by exercising undue
influence on the deceased, obtained new deeds wherein
the deceased left George out entirely; that he deeded
the home and the Promontory farm to defendants and
the Garland farm to Ren, but it is alleged that these
deeds are void. The plaintiffs pray judgment establishing the validity of the 1943 deeds and declaring the
1949 deeds to be void.
The defendants by their answer denied the validity of the 1943 deeds and asserted that the 1949 deeds
were valid. The pleadings require some analysis. The
plaintiffs in effect say that the 1943 deeds are valid
and if valid, the deceased left no estate. They then in
effeet say that if the 1943 deeds are not valid, neither
are the 1949 deeds, and therefore the property descended to the heirs-at-law. On the other hand the defendants say that the 1943 deeds are invalid and that
2
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the 1949 deeds are valid, but if the 1949 deeds are also
invalid, then the property is an asset of the d~r.~ased
and passed to his heirs. It is our understanding that
the only question raised by the plaintiffs and appellants concerns the application of the so called dead
man's statute, and the six statements of points relied
on by appellants deal exclusively with this question.
We shall therefore confine our argument to this matter.
ARGUMENT
Point 1. Section 104-49-2, U. C. A., 1943, in so far
as it is applicable to the case in question, provides as
follows:
''The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(3) A party to any civil action, suit or proceeding and any person directly interested in the
event thereof and any person from, through
or under whom such party or interested person derives his interest or title or any part
thereof, when the adverse party to such action,
suit or proceeding claims or opposes, sues or
defends as .... heir, legatee or devisee of any
deceased person, .... as to any statement by,
or transaction with, such deceased . . . . . or
matter of fact whatever, which must have been
equally within the knowledge of both the witness and such ... deceased person, unless such
witness is called to testify thereto by such adverse party so claiming or opposing, suing or
defending in such action, suit or proceeding.''
As stated by Mr. Justice Larsen in the case of
Maxfield vs. Sainsbury
110 Utah 280
172 Pac. 2nd 122
3
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"The cases like the language of the statute are
not entirely free from confusion.''
The question presented to this court involves the
application and construction of this statute as applied
to the undisputed facts. The four plaintiffs all claim
an interest in the property as grantees of the deceased
under the 1943 deeds. With respect to these deeds the
sole and only issue was whether or not the deceased,
during his lifetime, made a valid legal delivery of the
deeds. The evidence shows conclusvely that the deeds
were never recorded, no life estate was reserved therein
and that the deeds remained in the possession and under
the control of the deceased until shortly before his death
when he directed that these old deeds be destroyed after
the execution and delivery of the 1949 deeds. The plain·
tiffs claim to be the owners of this property as grantees.
Therefore, each and all of them are not only parties to
the action but they are claiming a direct interest in the
subject matter of the suit. They brought this suit
against their sister. Therefore, all of the heirs-at-law
are before the court as parties. They could have brought
the suit against an adminstrator of the estate of the
deceased, or they were within their rights in bringing
the suit by joining all of the heirs either as plaintiffs
or defendants. The defendant Marie T. Johnson is the
only other heir of the deceased. There can be no question but what the plaintiffs are parties to a civil action
and that they are also each and all directly interested
in the event thereof. The only question then for determination is the postion of the defendant Marie T. Johnson. It is our contention, and it was the view of the
trial court, that in so far as the question of the validity
4
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of the 1943 deeds are conce'rned the defendant Marie
T. Anderson Johnson was defending as an heir of the
deceased. If the plaintiffs had established the validity
of the 1943 deeds, then they would have taken from the
estate all of its assets. The defendant, as an heir of
the deceased, was defending :against their claim. She
defended on the grounds that these deeds were never
legally delivered and that therefore the property belonged to the deceased up to 1949. -And she further
claimed that if the 1949 deeds were also invalid, as
claimed by plaintiffs, then the property belonged to the
deceased at the time of his death; likewise the plaintiffs claimed that if the 1943 deeds were invalid for lack
of delivery, that the 1949 deeds were also invalid, and
the property belonged- to the estate.- It seems there-:fore, clear to us that the plaintiffs, by their .action,
were making an assault upon the estate and. that they
were directly interested in the event thereof. It also
seems equally clear that in the defense of the 1943
deeds the defendant was defending. as against the validity of these deeds as an heir of the deceased. The statute applies, not only when th.e adverse party to the
action sues or defends as an executor or administrator, but it also applies equally when the adverse party
sues or defends as an heir of the deceased person. Para~
phrasing the language used 'by this court in the case of
Rasmussen vs. Sevier Valley Canal
Company
40 Utah 371, 121 Pac. 741,
the plaintiffs and each of them were interested in the
event thereof. They were suing the only other h~ir of
the deceased. She was defending said suit as an. heirand under the statute the plaintiffs and each of them
5
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were incompetent to testify to any fact which was
equally within their knowledge and that of the decedent
unless they were called on behalf. of the defendant heir.
We think that this case is governed by
Clark vs. Clark
74 .utah 290
279 Pac. 502.
As we understand counsel for appellants, he does not
deny the fact that the evidence sought to be obtained
frqm the four plaintiffs was equally within their knowledge and the knowledge of the decedent. So it is merely
a question of whether or not the prohibition of t4e statute applied in this case with respect to the proffered
evidence of the plaintiffs. The fact that there are two
sets of deeds involved in this case somewhat complicates the situation. It seems to us clearly that had there
been no deeds executed in 1949, the position of defendants would be unassailable. The only question, it
seems to us, is whether or not, in· view of the fact that
tne defendant claims as a grantee of the deceased under
a subsequent. set .of deeds in any way changes her position in so far as her defense regarding the 1943 deeds
is concerned. We do not believe the fact that there
were other subsequent deeds executed in 1949 in any
way changes her position, when she is opposing the
validity of the 1943 deeds as an heir of the deceased
and when she is claiming that these deeds are invalid,
and when, as noted supra, the plaintiffs are making a
direct assault on the estate by claiming ownership in
this· property by reason of. the alleged delivery of the
deeds in question.
6
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With that thought in mind we stated our f>osition
very frankly to the court. It was, that when defendant
:Marie T. Johnson sought to establish the validity of the
1949 deeds then she was in precisely the same position
as the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs were in precisely
the same position as the defendant, that is that they
would then be defending as against the 1949 deeds as
heirs of the deceased and therefore the defendants
would likewise be prohibited under the statute from
testifying to any fact concerning the 1949 deeds which
was equally within their knowledge and that of the
decedent. In the trial of the case the transcript will
disclose that no attempt was made by the defendants
to testify to any facts concerning the execution and
delivery of the 1949 deeds which was equally within
their knowledge and that of the decedent, except as to
some matters which were brought out by the plaintiffs'
counsel in his asserted right of cross-examination. We
have read the :Maxfield vs. Sainsbury case relied upon
by appellants and we can see nothing in this case which
in our opinion supports appellants' position.
We contend, therefore, that the court correctly
interpreted the statute when he held that neither of
the plaintiffs could testify as to any fact which was
equally within their knowledge and that of the decedent
concerning the 1943 deeds. We shall have more to say
hereafter regarding the question of whether or not the
court adhered to his ruling.
Point 2. The other point raised by appellants is
with respect to the ruling of the trial court concerning
7
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the right of plaintiffs to call the defendants on crossexamination and to pursue this cross-examination concerning alleged facts equally within the knowledge of
the deceased and the defendants. Reverting to the
statute, it expressly provides that no person can be a
witness when the adverse party to such action claims
or opposes, sues or defends as an heir as to any matter
of fact which must have been equally within the knowledge of both the witness and the deceased, unless such
witness is called to testify thereto by such adverse
party so claiming or opposing, suing or defending in
such action. In other words, the statute does not say
that the evidence is incompetent. The statute says the
person cannot be a witness as to such matters unless
such witness is called by the executor, administrator,
heir, legatee or devisee who is defending the action. In
other words, with respect to the 1943 deeds, the defendant who was defending as [13'ainst their valiaity was the
only person who could call a d1sqaalified witness to
testify concerning matters equally within the knowledge of the deceased and the witness. That is a right
which is accorded the executor or heir who is defending
and is not a right accorded to the person who is making an assault upon the estate. The defendants were
placed in a peculiar position in this case when they
were called by the plaintiffs for cross-examnation. As
their attorney, the writer was confronted with a situation as to whether he should ohject to the competency of
the witness or not. If counsel stood by and permitted this
cross-examination without objection, then the questtion would arise as to whether or not defendant thereby
waived the benefit of the statute. If such examination
without objection could be deemed to be a waiver then

8
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of course it would open up the whole subject and would
permit plaintiffs to go into the matters elicited on the
cross-examination. Prior to the adoption of the new
rules plaintiffs could not have called defendants for a
cross-examination unless defendants had taken the stand
and testified regarding some matter or fact equally
within the knowledg·e of the witness and the deceased.
In other words, defendant would have the right, not
the plaintiff, to determine whether or not she chose to
open up the question and thereby waive the statute.
Plaintiffs seem to contend that under the new rules
they can force a defendant to waive this privilege by
the expediency of cross-examination. The new rules
do not purport to in any way change, modify or a brogate the dead man's statute and we do not believe it
was the intent of the legislature to repeal, modify or
change this statute by implication. The question squarely
presented, therefore, is whether or not a plaintiff can
call an adm~ni3trator or heir by cross-examination and
force such person to answer concerning matters which
the defendant as such administrator of heir may claim
the belief.
We further contend that, if erroneous, no prejudicial error resulted from the ruling of the court because
the court thereafter permitted plaintiffs to pursue in
a searching and persistent cross-examination of both
of the defendants with respect to the 1943 deeds. See
Transcript, pages 198 to 204, cross-examination of Chester N. Johnson, and Transcript, pages 117 to 129 and
pages 205 to 217, cross-examination of Marie T. Johnson. Certainly the court permitted plaintiffs' counsel
unlimited rights of cross-examinaton. We contend,
9
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therefore, that the court correctly construed the statute both with respect to the proffered testimony of the
plaintiffs, which was rejected, and to the proffered
testimony of the defendants elicited on cross-examination, but. that in any event the court subsequently receded from his previous ruling, to the point where he
permitted counsel full and complete latitude in his crossexamination of the defendants.

RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL
POINTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF HAVING CONSIDERED OTHER AND ADDITIONAL MATTERS
THAN THOSE RAISED BY APPELLANTS
The court erred in the following respects:
1. Notwithstanding the trial court ruled that the
dead man's statute prevented plaintiffs from testifying
as to matters equally within the knowledge of plaintiffs and the deceased respecting the alleged 1943 deeds,
yet the court erroneously permitted plaintiffs to testify at great length concerning "matters of fact" and
"transactions with the deceased in relation thereto"
which were equally within the knowledge of the witness
and the deceased.
2. The court erred in permitting plaintiffs' attorney
to pursue a prolonged and searching inquiry of the
defendant Marie T. Johnson as to what she believed
concerning the validity of the 1943 deeds and likewise
erred in permitting plaintiffs' attorney to pursue the
same cross-examination with respect to what the defendant Chester N. Johnson believed concerning the validity of the 1943 deeds.

10
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3. The court erred in overruling defendants' motion
for dismissal and for not granting defendants' motion
to withdraw from the jury any issue as to mental incapacity and for not granting defendants' motion withdrawing from the jury the issue of undue influence and
also in denying defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
4. The court erred in failing to give the following
instructions requested by the defendants: Requested
instructions numbered 1, 4 and 5.
We desire to briefly discuss defendants' additional
points for the purpose of having this court consider
these matters in its opinion.
RESPONDENTS' POINT 1. NOTWITHSTANDiNG THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT THE DEAD
~fAN'S
STATUTE PREVENTED PLAINTIFFS
FRO~I TESTIFYIXG AS TO :MATTERS EQUALLY
WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLAIN·
TIFFS AND THE DECEASED RESPECTING THE
ALLEGED 1943 DEEDS, YET THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED PLAINTIFFS TO TESTIFY AT GREAT LENGTH CONCERNING MATTERS
OF FACT AND TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEASED
IN RELATION
THERETO
WHICH
WERE
EQUALLY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
WITNESS AND THE DECEASED.
If respondents are correct in their contention that
the dead man's statute applied as to the plaintiffs and
prohibited them from testifying concerning matters
and facts and transactions with the deceased equally

11
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within their knowledge and the· knowledge of the deceased, then we think it must inevitably follow that the
court erred in subsequently admitting testimony of the
plaintiffs concerning facts and transactions with and
which must have been equally within the knowledge of
the deceased and the witness so testifying. See Tr. 103
to 108 relative to the ruling of the court. Notwithstanding the court's ruling he thereafter permitted
these plaintiffs to testify concerning matters, facts
and transactions which were equally within the knowledge of the witness so testifying and the deceased concerning the 1943 deeds. See testimony of George N.
Anderson commencing at page 109 to 117; testimony
of Imogene Anderson, Tr. 157 to 160 and 161 to 171.
See also Tr. 180 to 184, subsequent ruling of the court;
testimony of Lorenzo W. Anderson, Jr., Tr. 137 to 151.
As we construe the statute, the incompetency of
the witness is much broader than merely prohibiting
conversations between the deceased and the witness.
The statute makes this very clear because the prohibition extends to ''any statement by or transaction with
such deceased, or matter of fact whatever which must
have been· equally within the knowledge of both the
witness and such deceased person. '' We desire to call
attention specifically to the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Wolfe in the case of Maxfield vs. Sainsbury
concerning thi:3 rna tter.
RESPONDENTS' POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED
IN PERMITTNG PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY TO
PURSUE .A PROLONGED AND SEARCHING
INQ.UIRY OF THE DEFENDANT MARIE T. JOHNSON AS TO WHAT SHE BELIE1VED CONCERNING

12
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THE VALIDITY OF THE 1943 DEEDS AND LII\:EWISE ERRED IN PER~IITTING PLAINTIFFS'
ATTORNEY TO PURSUE THE SAME KIND OF
CROSS-EXAi\IINATION WITH R E S P E C T TO
WHAT THE DEFENDANT CHESTER N. JOHNSON BELIEVED CONCERNING THE VALIDITY
OF THESE DEEDS.
See cross-examination of :Marie T. Johnson, commencing on page 215. See also cross-examination of
Chester N. Johnson, page 201 to 205. It is our theory
that much of this cross-examination was improper for
the reason that no evidence on direct examination was
offered concerning the matter. It is also our view that
the cross-examination as to what the defendants may
have believed concerning the validity or the non-validity of these deeds is entirely immaterial. Many people
erroneously believe that an undelivered executed deed
passes a good title on death. The only question which
the jury was called upon to determine was the intent
of the grantor, not the belief of the grantees.

RESPONDENTS' POINT 3.
THE COURT
E R R E D IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTS'
~fOTION FOR DIS:\IISSAL AND FOR NOT GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO WITHDRAW
FRO~I THE JURY ANY ISSUE AS TO MENTAL
INCAPACITY AND FOR NOT GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION WITHDRAWING FROM THE JURY
THE ISSUE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE AND ALSO
IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT.

13
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At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case respondents
moved the court for a dismissal of plaintiffs' case on
the theory that there was no evidence to submit to the
jury either:
1. That the deceased had delivered the 1943 deeds;
or
2. That the deceased had failed to deliver the 1949
deeds; or
3. That deceased at the time of the execution thereof
was mentally incompetent or acting under undue
influence.
The court denied the motion. We confidently
believe that a review of the plaintiffs' evidence fails
to disclose any evidence upon which the court, as a
trier of the facts, or the jury, could find a valid legal
delivery of the 1943 deeds. The evidence discloses the
following undisputed facts evidencing non-delivery:
1. At the time he signed the 1943 deeds, deceased
was in good health. No suggestion is made as to why,
at that time, he would want to divest himself of all of
his property thereby leaving him destitiute.
2. He retained no life estate in the property.
3. The deeds were never recorded.
4. He thereafter continued to treat the property
as his own, collecting and retaining the rents, entering into leases of the Promontory property, signing
a right-of-way agreement with his brother Cephus on
the Garland property, paying the taxes and exercising
generally all right of ownership.

14
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5. The possession of these deeds was retained by
the deceased. He kept them in a special compartment
in his own desk in his own home.
Each and all of these facts, which are undisputed,
in the absenee of evidence to the contrary, shows conclu~iYely that the deceased never intended a delivery
of the deeds. The evidence further shows that during
his lifetime decedent had made many deeds. One time
making his wife grantee, another time making 1\fa.rie
grantee. In fact the evidence shows he made dozens
of deeds which apparently he considered as merely
testamentary in character. We contend the evidence
conclusively shows that when he signed the 1943 deeds
it was his intent that the same was merely testamentary
in character and that he did not intend to deliver said
deeds or to pass any present interest in the property.
Conversely we contend, with respect to the 1949
deeds, that the evidence conclusively shows a then
present intent to make a present delivery of these deeds.
The testimony of John W. Phillips is conclusive on this
point. Decedent's declaration to Marie to record her
deed shows conclusively an intent at that time to make
an absolute unconditional delivery.
We further contend that there was no evidence
upon which the jury could have found either that the
deceased was incompetent at the time he executed and
delivered the 1949 deeds or that he was acting under
duress or undue influence. If the court was correct
in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, he should
have granted the motion to withdraw these issues from
15:
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the jury. With respect to incompetency, there was evidence, which is not disputed, that in 1947 or therebouts the deceased suffered a stroke and that he was
very ill. It is conceded that there were times during
that period when his mind was affected. However
there was no evidence of any mental incapacity at the'
time he signed the 1949 deeds. It was admitted by
everyone that his health greatly improved, and the
testimony of John W. Phillips, Dr. Moskowitz, his
brother Cephus Anderson to the effect that at the time
he signed the deeds his mind was clear and that he
understood and fully appreciated the nature of the
act which he was doing, stands undisputed in this record.
RE/SPONDENTS' POINT 4. THE COURT ERRED
IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANTS'
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 1, 4 and 5.
We have already discussed the matters covered by
defendant's requested instruction number 1 for a
directed verdict. If there was evidence of mental incapacity or undue influence, then the court should have
given to the jury defendants' requested instructions
number 4 and 5. We do not believe that the court in
his instructions covered the matters contained in either
of these requests and we also believe that the requested
instructions contain a correct statement of the law.
We contend that the errors assigned by appellants for
a reversal cannot be sustained and that the judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
THATCHER & YOUNG
Attorneys for Respondents
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